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I. INTRODUCTION
A fter the passage of the 1978 Bankruptcy Reform Act,' the credit
industry initiated a well-coordinated lobbying effort that utilized
extensive surveys and the news media to demonstrate that the 1978
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bankruptcy legislation made it too easy and profitable for an individual
to file bankruptcy.2 Indeed, the number of bankruptcy filings increased
significantly after the adoption of the 1978 Act. The following tables
demonstrate the rapid growth in bankruptcy filings in the years 1978 to
1982.
TABLE 13
Year Ending Total Non-
June 30 Filings Business Business
1972 182,869 164,737 18,132
1973 173,197 155,707 17,490
1974 189,513 168,767 20,746
1975 254,484 224,354 30,130
1976 246,549 211,348 35,201
1977 214,399 182,210 32,189
1978 202,951 172,423 30,528
1979 226,476 196,976 29,500
1980 360,957 314,856 45,857
1981 519,063 452,145 66,006
1982 527,811 449,839 77,503
Table 2 indicates the percentage change in filings for the same years.
TABLE 24
Numerical
Year Ending Total Increase or Percentage
June 30 Filings Decrease Change
182,869
173,197
189,513
254,484
246,549
214,399
202,951
226,476
-18,483
-9,672
+ 16,316
+64,971
-7,935
-32,150
-11,448
+23,525
-9.2
-5.3
+9.4
+ 34.3
-3.1
-13.0
-5.3
+11.6
2 Warren, Reducing Bankruptcy Protection for Consumers: A Response, 72 GEO. L.J.
1333 (1984). See also Black and Herbert, Bankcard's Revenge: A Critique of the 1984
Consumer Credit Amendments to the Bankruptcy Code, 19 U. RicH. L. REv. 845 (1985);
Morris, Substantive Consumer Bankruptcy Reform in. the Bankruptc Amend ncts Act -f
1984, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 91 (1985).
' Annual Report of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts (1982). See
also Breitowitz, New Developments in Consumer Bankruptcies: Chapter 7 Dismissal on the
Basis of Substantial Abuse (pts. 1 & 2), 59 AM. BANKR. L.J. 327 (1985), 60 AM. BANKR. L.J. 33
(1986).
4 Annual Report of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts (1982). See
also Breitowitz, supra note 3.
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TABLE 2 continued
Numerical
Year Ending Total Increase or Percentage
June 30 Filings Decrease Change
1980 360,957 + 134,481 + 59.4
1981 519,063 + 158,106 +43.8
1982 527,811 +8,748 +1.7
In response to criticism by the credit industry and the dramatic rise in
the amount of consumer bankruptcy filings, a number of provisions
relating to consumer credit, often referred to as the "Consumer Credit
Amendments," were included in the Bankruptcy Amendments and Fed-
eral Judgeship Act of 1984. 5 One of the stated purposes of the "Consumer
Credit Amendments" was to decrease the number of personal bankrupt-
cies. Senator Hatch, a strong supporter of the bill, made the following
statement during consideration of the conference report:
The number of consumer bankruptcy cases filed has risen dra-
matically each year since the bankruptcy code was last amended
in 1978. Several witnesses before the Senate Judiciary Commit-
tee pointed to these changes in the Code as the principal cause of
the increase. The 1978 amendments generally eased a debtor's
access to bankruptcy to avoid excessive indebtedness. Title II
[Consumer Credit Amendments] contains over 30 substantive
amendments to curb abuses of the bankruptcy code and make its
use truly a last resort. 6
Another concern prompting the legislation was the availability of
affordable consumer credit. The Senate Report, in an early version of the
bill which eventually became the Consumer Credit Amendments, in-
cluded the following discussion:
The ever-increasing number of bankruptcies, and the resultant
financial losses, constitutes a general burden on the economy of
billions of dollars annually. In the short term, these costs are
shifted from debtor to lender (and stockholders and owners of the
institutions providing credit). In the long run, however, creditors
will not continue to bear the losses; instead, the realities of the
marketplace will force them to seek greater protection by increas-
ing the cost of obtaining credit, requiring additional collateral or
cosignors, and/or reducing their financial risks by eliminating
some transactions completely. For example, testimony by credit
s Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333 (1984) (codified in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C.).
6 130 CONG. REC. S8891, 8894 (daily ed. June 29, 1984).
1988]
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industry experts revealed that some consumer credit compa-
nies-which previously made loans which were secured only by
personal property-now are making a large proportion of loans
secured by second mortgages on the consumer's residence. As a
consequence of such creditor responses, credit will become more
difficult to obtain, and the general cost of doing business will
escalate. Such a result is directly at odds with congressional
efforts to make credit more widely available-for example, by
statutes such as the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, and the Fair
Credit Reporting Act.
7
Moreover, in explaining the need for the Consumer Credit Amendments,
Congressman Anderson stated:
[The 1978 Act] made it easier for a debtor to obtain Chapter 7
relief because it does not require that he give serious consider-
ation to a Chapter 13 repayment plan. This has worked to the
detriment of creditors and consumers alike. A recent GAO report
suggests that 40 percent of those who file for Chapter 7 relief have
income, assets and debts comparable to those seeking Chapter 13
relief. These improper Chapter 7 filings may cost the lending
industry as much as $1.25 billion annually in lost revenues. And,
as with anything else, these losses are passed along to consumers
in the form of higher interest rates, credit fees, and increased
prices for goods and services.8
Section 707(b)9 is one of the most significant changes included in the
Consumer Credit Amendments. This entirely new provision allows
bankruptcy courts to dismiss a Chapter 7 petition for substantial abuse
when the case is filed by an individual debtor whose debts are primarily
consumer debts. Section 707(b) reads as follows:
After notice and a hearing, the court, on its own motion or on a
motion by the United States trustee, but not at the request or
suggestion of any party in interest, may dismiss a case filed by an
individual debtor under this chapter whose debts are primarily
consumer debts if it finds that the granting of relief would be a
substantial abuse of the provisions of this chapter. There shall be
a presumption in favor of granting the relief requested by the
debtor.10
s. REP. No. 446, 97th Cong., 2d. Sess. 6 (1982) (footnote omitted).
8 130 CONG. REC. H7499 (daily ed. June 29, 1984).
s 11 U.S.C.A. § 707(b) (West Supp. 1987) (1986 amendment clarified that U.S. trustee
could raise the issue of substantial abuse).
10 Id.
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The purpose of the Consumer Credit Amendments is clearly expressed.
However, the language of section 707(b) and the sparse and conflicting
statements of legislative intent behind section 707(b) have given rise to
four difficult issues that have not been resolved consistently by the
courts: (1) What is the effect of a party in interest raising the issue of
substantial abuse? (2) What is the appropriate definition of the phrase
"primarily consumer debts"? (3) What circumstances would constitute
substantial abuse? (4) What is the effect of the presumption in favor of
relief?
The ultimate resolution of these issues will determine if the legislation
will create an improved bankruptcy system or dramatically alter the
traditional "fresh start" approach to individual bankruptcy. This Article
reviews various court decisions and attempts to provide a workable
framework for the application of the concepts embodied in section 707(b).
II. MOTION TO DISMISS
Motions to dismiss a Chapter 7 petition for substantial abuse may be
brought by the court or the United States trustee, provided such action is
not at the request or suggestion of any party in interest. Congress' intent
to preclude creditors from raising the issue of substantial abuse is
evidenced by the legislative history of the 1986 Amendment. In 1986,
section 707(b) was amended to clarify that the United States trustee
could raise the issue of substantial abuse." The House Conference Report
1 The essential duties of the trustee are as follows:
(1) To collect and reduce to money the property of the estate and to close up such
estate as expeditiously as is compatible with the best interests of parties in
interest;
(2) To be accountable for all property received;
(3) To investigate the financial affairs of the debtor;
(4) If a purpose would be served (e.g., as where there are assets to be distributed),
to examine proofs of claims and object to the allowance of any claim that is
improper;
(5) If advisable, to oppose the discharge of the debtor if grounds for such objection
exist, since the trustee represents the creditors as well as the debtor and the
court;
(6) To furnish such information concerning the estate and the estate's adminis-
tration as is requested by a party in interest;
(7) If the business of the debtor is authorized to be operated, to file with the court
and with the appropriate governmental unit charged with the responsibility
for collection or determination of any tax arising out of such operation,
periodic reports and summaries of the operation of such business, including a
statement of receipts and disbursements, and such other information as the
court requires; and
(8) To make a final report and file a final account of the administration of the
estate with both the court and with the United States trustee.
See 28 U.S.C.A. 586(a) (West Supp. 1987).
1988]
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on the amendment noted that the "original intent . . . was to preclude
creditors from exercising this function [bringing information on substan-
tial abuse to the courts attention' 12 Representative Fish, one of the
legislative managers of the Amendment, made the following comment on
the floor: 'ITihe 'party in interest' phrase in section 707(b) was intended
to mean creditors .... "13 The prohibition against a creditor raising the
issue of substantial abuse was apparently included in the legislation to
quell concerns that creditors would routinely move for dismissals,
thereby burdening debtors with the additional expense and time involved
in demonstrating that Chapter 7 bankruptcy relief is appropriate.14
Senator Metzenbaum's comments, as the Senate adopted the conference
report, support this conclusion. He stated:
I also am extremely pleased that this bill prohibits creditors from
filing motions attempting to deny bankruptcy relief to individu-
als because of substantial abuse. If a creditor asks a court to
dismiss a case claiming that there has been substantial abuse [of
the bankruptcy laws by the debtor, the court would not be]
allowed to do so. Only a bankruptcy court, acting on its own
initiative, could dismiss a case involving substantial abuse. This
will preclude creditors from making bankruptcy too expensive for
the debtor by filing harassing motions alleging substantial
abuse. 1-5
The statutory language and legislative intent clearly provide that the
court can only exercise the power to dismiss for substantial abuse sua
sponte16 or upon a motion by the United States trustee. Courts that have
ruled upon motions by creditors to dismiss a case pursuant to section
707(b) have denied the use of such motions. However, a more troubling
issue has arisen when a party in interest has merely suggested that the
court consider holding a section 707(b) hearing, or has raised the
possibility of dismissal in the course of other proceedings.
One of the earliest cases to address a motion by a creditor was In re
Christian.'7 In Christian, the Union Chelsea Bank, a creditor of Chris-
tian, made a motion requesting that the court hold a hearing to
12 H.R. CONF. REP. No. 958, 99th Cong. 2d Sess. 46-7, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG.
& An. NEws 5246, 5247-8.
13 132 CoNc.. REc. H9000-9001 (daily ed. Oct 2, 1986)
14 These concerns were expressed when an earlier version of the law was being
considered which allowed creditors to challenge Chapter 7 filings. S. REP. No. 446, 97th
Cong., 2d Sess. 49-53 (1982) (minority views of Senators Metzenbaum and Kennedy).
' 130 CONG. REc. S7624-25 (daily ed. June 19, 1984).
16 "Of his or its own will or motion; voluntarily; without prompting or suggestion."
BLAcKs LAw DICnONARY 1592 (4th ed. 1968).
17 51 Bankr. 118 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1985).
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determine whether the bankruptcy petition should be dismissed pursuant
to section 707(b).18 In denying the Bank's motion, the court relied upon
the "plain meaning approach" to the statutory language and legislative
history. After reviewing the legislative history of the 1978 Bankruptcy
Act concerning the phrase "on request of a party in interest," the court
stated:
Congress was clear that when it said "on request of a party in
interest," it prohibited the court from acting sua sponte. A very
simple reversal of that term leads to the conclusion that when it
says not at the request of a party in interest, it is specifically
directing the court to act sua sponte.19
The court also referred to Senator Metzenbaum's statement on the floor
of the Senate as the conference report to the 1984 Amendments was
adopted, 20 and discussed the consequences of permitting creditors to move
for dismissal. In the court's opinion:
[T]he flood gates could open every time there is an adversary
proceeding concerning the dischargeability of a debt or the
granting of a discharge. If the creditor lost on substantive basis or
lost for failure to file it within time, he would get another bite at
the apple. The creditor would get a hearing on whether or not
there has been substantial abuse .... 21
The court further noted that unlike other code provisions concerning
consumer cases, there are no penalties that can be imposed upon creditors
for being wrong. 22
Under Christian, then, a court cannot respond to a motion by a creditor
to hold a hearing in order to determine whether or not the petition should
be dismissed for substantial abuse.23 Additionally, although not clearly
stated, the court indicated that the creditor's motion to dismiss may taint
the entire case, precluding the court from raising the issue of substantial
abuse.24
The issue of substantial abuse arose in an interesting fashion in the
18 It should be noted that this case was decided prior to the 1986 amendment to section
707(b) permitting motions by the U.S. trustee. The United States trustee urged the court to
have himself or the designated trustee pursue the motion. However, the court determined
that trustees were parties in interest.
'9 51 Bankr. 118, 120 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1985).
20 See supra text accompanying note 15.
21 51 Bankr. 118, 120 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1985).
22 Id. at 121.
23 Id. at 122. See also In re Cecil, 71 Bankr. 730 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1987) (section 707(b)
denies creditors standing to move for dismissal).
24 51 Bankr. 118, 120 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1985).
19881
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case of In re Campbell.25 In Campbell, a creditor filed a document entitled
"Suggestions of Lawrence National In Opposition to Discharge." The
court noted that "[t]hese were filed, not as an adversary action, not as a
motion, but apparently as an assistance to the court in the event that the
court would otherwise fail to recognize the signal flags of substantial
abuse." 26
In dealing with the Bank's suggestions, the court addressed the
following questions:
(1) [S]hould the pleading of the Bank be considered by the court
in its ... deliberations under section 707(b)?;
(2) Do such suggestions poison the process, so that any indepen-
dent investigation by the court is tainted and would consti-
tute what in criminal practice parlance would be termed
"fruit of the poison tree"?;
(3) [S]hould the court impose sanctions on an aggressive creditor
who has overstepped the boundaries of the statute?
27
The court began answering these questions by noting the inconsistencies
found in the Congressional intent of the 1978 Act and section 707(b).
Under the 1978 Act, Congress intended creditors to participate fully in
the bankruptcy process by policing the acts of debtors. However, in
section 707(b), creditors were completely removed. 28
In answer to the first question, the court decided that the statute and
Congressional intent were clear. The suggestions of the bank could not be
considered. 29 Having so concluded, the court promptly disregarded the
Bank's suggestions.30
Turning to the second question, the court determined that the Bank's
suggestions did not preclude the court from making an independent
finding of substantial abuse.31 The court disagreed with Senator Metzen-
baum's reading of the statute and reasoned that to conclude otherwise
would defeat the general spirit of the Bankruptcy Code and discourage
creditors from participating in the process. 32 The court stated:
Public policy which this court understands to be that honest
debtors should have a fresh start would not be served by saying
that a debtor who has abused the process should be rewarded as
a result of an overzealous act upon the part of a good faith
5 63 Bankr. 702 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1996).
26 Id. at 703.
27 Id. at 704.
28 Id.
29 Id. at 705.
3) 63 Bankr. 702, 705.
31 Id.
32 Id.
[Vol. 36:385
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creditor. The court is put in mind of the old adage that "Two
wrongs do not make a right." If the debtor has abused the system
or its spirit, the sin of the creditor in pointing it out does not make
the debtor's act proper. 33
Ultimately, the court reviewed the case for substantial abuse but
determined that dismissal was not warranted. 34
The court also decided not to impose sanctions on the bank for
suggesting that the court dismiss the case under section 707(b). In the
court's opinion, the public policy and philosophy of creditor participation
overshadowed the fact that the Bank suggested dismissal.35 Further-
more, the court noted that "in weighing the potential harm to debtors by
isolated acts of this type the court believes that the general restriction of
substantial abuse outweighs any need for the imposition of penalties. 3 6
The court added, however, that a different result might be in order should
the Bank persist in such conduct. 37
3 Id.
34 Id. at 706.
" 63 Bankr. 702, 705.
36 id.
17 Id. See also In re Hudson, 56 Bankr. 415, 420 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985) which
employed the same analysis, but from the case it is unclear how the issue of substantial
abuse was brought to the court's attention:
While it appears that the provisions of section 707(b) should be given their
ordinary and plain meaning, to do so is to present the court with a practical
difficulty in the event a party-in-interest should bring a case to the court's
attention. On one hand, the court may not act pursuant to section 707(b) if a case
has been brought to its attention by a party-in-interst. On the other hand, the
court cannot ignore information which has been brought before it, regardless of
how the information was obtained. If a rule were devised, whereby a court could
not act pursuant to section 707(b) if a case was called to the court's attention by
a party-in-interest, such a rule would have a deterrent effect on the parties who
would otherwise make this information available. However, it would also have
the effect of preventing the court from acting in cases where an abuse of Title 11
Chapter 7 is most likely to be occurring.
This court cannot sanction flagrant violations of the restrictions which limit
parties-in-interest from suggesting the review of a case for dismissal under
section 707(b). However, this court also cannot sanction abuse of Chapter 7,
particularly when Congress has authorized the courts to challenge cases in which
abuse is suspected. If given the choice as to which of these violations should be
overlooked, this court believes that public policy and equity require that it be the
former. This is not to say that repeated violations by any particular party-in-
interest will go unattended. Rather, the court should retain the option of pursuing
a case under section 707(b) dependent upon the intent and past practices of the
party which calls attention to a case. Therefore, this court must conclude that
unless a party or their counsel flagrantly, intentionally, or repeatedly violates the
limitations under 11 U.S.C. § 707(b), the court will not necessarily be precluded
from dismissing a case pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 707(b), despite the fact that a
1988]
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In the case of In re Jones,3s the issue of substantial abuse was brought
to the court's attention through a statement filed by Mr. Rankin, a
non-interested party. Mr. Rankin, however, had signed the statement
upon the request of an attorney for a creditor. The court determined that
since the statement was initiated at the suggestion of a party in interest,
the question of substantial abuse was improperly brought to the court's
attention.39 As a consequence, the court was precluded from considering
whether the debtor's petition constituted a substantial abuse.40
The facts giving rise to the possibility of substantial abuse were
brought to the courts' attention during other bankruptcy proceedings in
the cases of In re Mastroeni41 and In re Keniston.42 In Mastroeni, the court
found no issue in the possibility that dismissal for substantial abuse came
to the courts attention during a hearing on a motion by a creditor for
relief from the automatic stay.
4 3
In Keniston, the application of section 707(b) may be affected by the
resolution of constitutional questions.44 However, the court discussed the
issue of a proper motion. The possibility of substantial abuse was brought
to the court's attention during a pre-trial hearing on a creditor's com-
plaint objecting to the dischargeability of certain debts arising from
divorce proceedings. In this hearing, the creditor's ex-wife contended that
party-in-interest brought to light information which subjects a case to scrutiny
under that section.
3 60 Bankr. 96 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1986).
39 Id. at 98.
40 Id.
41 56 Bankr. 456 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985).
42 60 Bankr. 742 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1986).
4' 56 Bankr. 456 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985).
41 In Keniston, Bankruptcy Judge James E. Yacos raised five constitutional issues:
1. Does the statute deny procedural due process by constituting the judicial officer
who must decide the ultimate question of the debtor's right to bankruptcy
relief as in effect "accuser" or "prosecutor" initiating the complaint against the
debtor?
2. Is the requisite "case and controversy" requirement for federal jurisdiction
under Article III of the Constitution present when no other party besides the
court itself has raised any issue or dispute requiring judicial determination?
3. If this statute is construed to require the judicial officer to review all
bankruptcy petitions to determine whether some involve "substantial abuse"
requiring objection and possible denial of bankruptcy relief, does the placing of
that review and processing function with a judicial officer violate the separa-
tion of powers doctrine inherent in the Constitution?
4. Is there a violation of substantive due process by the arguably vague language
of this statute giving no standard for its application and apparently indicating
"abuse" of the bankruptcy laws is permissible but "substantial abuse" is not?
5. Does the statute deny equal protection of the law by drawing a distinction
between "consumer" debtors and other debtors for relief under Chapter 7
without a rational basis?
Id. at 744-45. These issues remain unresolved pending further hearing and briefing.
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the debtor's conduct constituted abuse. The court noted the following in a
footnote:
The very fact that the ex-wife voiced these contentions at the
pre-trial hearing could itself be construed as a violation of the
§ 707(b) language prohibiting the substanial [sic] issue to come
forward "at the request or suggestion of any party in interest."
However, it is not unusual for creditors to object generally to
"abuse" by the debtor in conjunction with various adversary
proceedings and that is all that occurred here. Left for another
day is the question of deliberate efforts to provoke a "sua sponte"
§ 707(b) order by the artful use of an unrelated adversary
proceeding to that end.
4 5
Arguably, however, the creditor in this case had deliberately tried to
provoke a section 707(b) dismissal. After the court ordered the substan-
tial abuse hearing, the creditor failed to take advantage of the opportu-
nity to amend her dischargeability complaint. In addition, the court
concluded that there was no doubt that the obligations objected to by the
creditor were dischargeable. 46
Clearly, a bankruptcy court should not hold a section 707(b) hearing in
direct response to a motion or suggestion of a party in interest. However,
such a motion or suggestion should not foreclose the court from making
an independent determination that the case may constitute substantial
abuse. If, after an independent examination of the case, the court decides
to hold a section 707(b) hearing, the court is acting sua sponte as required
by the statute. Although this solution is in conflict with specific state-
ments in the legislative history, it does not defeat the purpose which
prompted Congress to include the prohibition against a creditor raising
the issue: that creditors would harrass debtors and make bankruptcy too
expensive. The independent determination by the court assures that
creditors cannot use section 707(b) to harrass debtors in Chapter 7.
Moreover, a debtor should not be granted relief under Chapter 7 when the
case constitutes substantial abuse simply because a creditor has sug-
gested dismissal under section 707(b). 47
41 Id. at 744 n.1 (citation omitted).
46 Id. at 743.
47 Other commentators have suggested that the bankruptcy court impose a rebuttable
presumption whenever a creditor takes action to raise the issue of substantial abuse, that
it is at the request or suggestion of a party in interest, and therefore, improper. This
presumption could then be rebutted by establishing that the party in interest's action did
not affect the court's decision. See Black and Herbert, supra note 2, at 857.
1988]
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III. PRIMARILY CONSUMER DEBTS
The second issue raised by section 707(b) is the definition of the phrase
"primarily consumer debts." The phrase actually presents two separate
issues: (1) what is a "consumer debt"?; and (2) what is "primarily" a
consumer debt? The language of the section is subject to many different
interpretations, as demonstrated in numerous court decisions to date.
A. Consumer Debt vs. Non-Consumer Debt
The term "consumer debt" is defined in the Bankruptcy Code as "debt
incurred by an individual primarily for a personal, family or household
purpose." 48 The legislative history indicates that the bankruptcy defini-
tion was "adapted from the definition used in various consumer protec-
tion laws."49 Presumably, among the laws referred to by Congress were
the Truth in Lending Act,50 the Consumer Product Safety Act, 51 and the
Uniform Commercial Code. 52 Under each of these laws, the definitions
focus on the purpose of the transaction in an attempt to differentiate
between personal, family, household, and business or commercial
purposes.53
The definition of consumer debt has been at issue in a number of
bankruptcy cases concerning provisions other than section 707(b). The
issue of consumer purpose as opposed to business purpose has been
previously addressed. In In re Nenninger,54 the court was called upon to
decide whether attorney fees should be awarded following the debtors'
successful defense of a credit union's claim that the debt was not
dischargeable. Under 11 U.S.C. section 523(d), the debtor is entitled to
attorney fees when the debt is a "consumer debt." The proceeds of
the credit union loan were used to purchase a commercial campground.
The court denied attorney fees stating that the appropriate test is the
48 11 U.S.C.A. § 101(7) (West 1979).
4' H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 309 (1977); S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. 22 (1978), reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS S787.
50 15 U.S.C.A. § 1601-1693 (West 1982 & Supp. 1987).
5' 15 U.S.C.A. § 2051-2076 (West 1982 & Supp. 1987).
52 E.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 336.9-.109 (West 1966).
53 Regulation Z, issued to implement the Truth in Lending Act, defines "consumer
credit" as "credit offered or extended to a consumer primarily for personal, family or
household purposes." 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(12) (1987). The Consumer Product Safety Act
defines consumer product as any article for sale or personal use to a consumer for in around
a household or residence, a school or recreation. 15 U.S.C.A. § 2052(a)(1) (West 1982).
Consumer good is defined in the Uniform Commercial Code as goods used or bought for use
primarily for personal family or household purposes. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 336.9-.109 (West
1966).
"' 32 Bankr. 624 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1983).
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"purpose of the loan"55 and that "[u]nder the plain language of the statute
[section 101(7)], a loan to purchase a commercial campground cannot be
a consumer debt."5 6 In reaching this conclusion, the court referred to two
earlier cases which arose in a similar context. The court in In re Valley
57
stated that a loan to purchase a truck-tractor for use in the logging
business was not a consumer debt. The court in In re McCourt58 ruled that
a debt incurred to purchase an apartment complex was not a consumer
debt. Subsequent to the decision in Nenninger, two bankruptcy courts
determined that debts incurred in the contracting business were not for
personal, family or household purposes. 59
Bankruptcy Code sections 130160 and 12016, also contain provisions
which treat consumer debt differently from other debt although in a
different context. Both sections extend the stay of relief to co-debtors
when the debt is a consumer debt. The court in In re Stein62 discussed
section 1301 and the meaning of the term "consumer debt." The debt at
issue was a consolidation loan which enabled the debtors to pay off
various business debts owed in connection with a family farming opera-
tion, including debts on a combine, cattle, fertilizer, farming equipment,
hay, and seed. The loan was also used to pay some personal obligations
incurred for items such as food and doctor bills. The vast majority of the
loan, however, was used to repay farming obligations. The court con-
cluded that section 1301 did not protect the co-debtors. The court stated
that the debt was a non-consumer debt because "a large portion of the
debt encompassed obligations relating directly to the family farming
operation, an operation, which is, in fact, the debtor's business."6 3
The same result was reached in In re Circle Five, Inc.64 and in In re
Bigalk,65 both involving section 1201. Circle Five involved a $402,000
real estate loan from the Federal Land Bank. In deciding whether the
debt was a consumer debt, the court noted that the definition was adopted
from the various consumer protection laws. In addition, under the
Uniform Commercial Code the critical factor used to distinguish non-
consumer goods from consumer goods "is the use of the goods in the
production of income as opposed to normal consumptive activity by an
" Id. at 625.
56 Id.
"' 21 Bankr. 674 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1982).
58 20 Bankr. 388 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1982).
51 In re Nicholson, 51 Bankr. 198 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1985); In re Pelen, 33 Bankr. 763
(Bankr. M.D. Pa. 1983).
60 11 U.S.C.A. § 1301(a) (West 1979).
61 11 U.S.C.A. § 1201(a) (West Supp. 1987).
62 18 Bankr. 768 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1982).
63 Id. at 769.
64 75 Bankr. 686 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1987).
65 75 Bankr. 561 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1987).
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individual."66 Accordingly, the court stated that "for a debt to be a
consumer debt it must be incurred principally to achieve a personal,
family or household [purpose]," and that "[d]ebts for a business purpose
are not consumer debts.16 7 With regard to the Federal Land Bank loan,
the court reasoned:
The Debtor is a family farm corporation. The debt incurred is
secured by real property. The real property is for the purpose of
the farm operation. The farm operation is a business for the
production of income. Debt used to produce income is not a
consumer debt primarily for a personal, family or household
purpose.68
As such, the cosigners were not protected by section 1201.69 Along the
same lines, the court in Bigalk stated that "extension of credit for the
commencement or continuation of large-scale agricultural or business
activity simply is not made for a personal, family or household
purpose." 70
In a different context, the court in In re Constantino7 1 was confronted
with determining whether the debt, which arose from an agreement
under which Interstate was to purchase and sell index options for the
debtor, was a consumer debt. Bankruptcy Code section 523(a)(2)(C) 72
creates a presumption of non-dischargeability of consumer debts which
exceed $500 for luxury goods or services. Using the same rationale as in
Circle Five, the court concluded that the debt was not a consumer debt
and thus, the presumption did not apply.73
The only bankruptcy decision to discuss consumer purpose versus
business purpose under section 707(b) is In re Almendinger.7 4 In Almen-
dinger, the debtor was a stockbroker. He had incurred debts totalling
approximately $120,000 on his credit card accounts. At the section 707(b)
hearing, the debtor testified that, with the exception of purchasing some
baby furniture for his newborn daughter, the debt represented cash
advances which he used to pay off investment losses and to reinvest in the
stock market. In deciding whether the debts were consumer debts, the
court referred to the legislative history of section 101(7) which indicates
that the definition of consumer debt was derived from the definition used
66 75 Bankr. 686, 688 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1987).
17 Id. (footnote omitted).
68 id.
69 Id.
v 75 Bankr. 561, 566 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1987) (footnote omitted).
v' 72 Bankr. 189 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1986).
72 11 U.S.C.A. § 523(a)(2)(C) (West Supp. 1987).
7' 72 Bankr. 189, 192 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1986).
71 56 Bankr. 97 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985).
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in the various consumer protection laws. The court then noted that "the
definition of 'consumer credit' transaction under the [Truth in Lending
Act] is markedly similar to the definiton of consumer debt under the
Bankruptcy Code"75 and that a review of the cases under the Truth in
Lending Act "shows that when the credit transaction involves a profit
motive, it is outside the definition of 'consumer credit' transaction for the
purposes of the Act [Truth in Lending]." 76 Further, the court pointed out
that the Truth in Lending Act exempts transactions involving business
and commercial purposes, concluding that the profit motive was the
decisive factor in distinguishing the type of transaction. 77 Thus, the court
concluded that the credit card debt was not consumer debt because the
purpose for the cash advances was to make a profit and, therefore, section
707(b) did not apply to the debtor.7 8
As a result of the vast body of case law developed under the various
consumer protection laws, the bankruptcy courts should have some
assistance distinguishing consumer debt from business debt. However,
troubling issues remain unresolved.
B. Mortgage Debt
A difficult and important issue yet to be resolved is whether a mortgage
obligation is a consumer debt. As stated, section 101(7) provides that
consumer debt is debt incurred for a personal, family, or household
purpose. The definition makes no distinction between secured and unse-
cured debt. Nevertheless, legislative history includes statements by
Senator DiConcini and Representative Edwards that the term "consumer
75 Id. at 99.
76 Id.
77 Id. It is interesting to note that the Truth in Lending Regulations do not set forth a
profit motive test for distinguishing between business or commercial purposes and con-
sumer purpose credit. Instead, the following factors are used to determine whether credit to
finance an acquisition, such as securities, is primarily for business purposes as opposed to
consumer purposes.
1. The relationship of the borrower's primary occupation to the acquisition. The
more closely related, the more likely it is to be business purpose.
2. The degree to which the borrower will personally manage the acquisition. The
more personal involvement there is, the more likely it is to be business
purpose.
3. The ratio of income from the acquisition to the total income of the borrower.
The higher the ratio, the more likely it is to be business purpose.
4. The size of the transaction. The larger the transaction, the more likely it is to
be business purpose.
5. The borrower's statement of purpose for the loan.
12 C.F.R. Comment 226.3 (a)(2)(1987).
71 56 Bankr. 97, 99 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985).
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debt" does not include any debt which is secured by real property.79 Both
Congressmen played central roles in the passage of the Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1978.
The bankruptcy courts which have addressed this issue outside the
scope of section 707(b) have all reached the conclusion that a mortgage
loan does not constitute a consumer debt.8 0 Each decision simply refers,
without further analysis, to the statements of Congressmen DiConcini
and Edwards in the legislative history. One court made the comment that
to hold otherwise would undermine the Congressional intent."1
When dismissal for substantial abuse under section 707(b) is at issue,
the bankruptcy courts are split as to whether debts secured by real
property are consumer debts. The Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appeals
Panel, in the case of In re Kelly, s2 held that debts secured by the debtor's
residence were not consumer debts for the purposes of section 707(b).83 In
reaching this conclusion, the Appeals Panel noted the key roles that
Congressmen DiConcini and Edwards played in the passage of the Bank-
ruptcy Reform Act of 1978, but concluded that individual explanatory
comments cannot be used to rewrite the plain language that Congress, as
a whole, enacted in section 101(7).84 The court then reasoned:
[T]he exclusion of debts secured by real property is logical and
consistent with the purpose behind § 707(b). A debtor owning a
family home usually has substantial debt secured by real prop-
erty. The debt secured by the residence is usually three or four
times (or greater) than the aggregate of unsecured debt. There-
fore, unless that secured debt is disregarded, all such debtors
could be denied relief because their indebtedness would be
primarily consumer debt; certainly in dollar amount. In addition,
it is common knowledge that the consumer loan industry pro-
posed and lobbied heavily for the so-called consumer bankruptcy
71 124 CONG. REc. H11,090 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Edwards); 124
CONG. REC. S17,406 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978) (remarks of Sen. DeConcini).
" In re Ikeda, 37 Bankr. 193 (Bankr. D. Hawaii 1984); In re Nenninger, 32 Bankr. 624
(W.D. Wis. 1983); In re Randolph, 28 Bankr. 811 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1983); In re Stein, 18
Bankr. 768 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1982). See also In re Burgess, 22 Bankr. 771 (Bankr. M.D.
Tenn. 1982).
sl In re Ikeda, 37 Bankr. 193, 195 (Bankr. D. Hawaii 1984).
82 70 Bankr. 109 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1986). It should be noted that the 1984 Act provides
for a system of appeals in which the district court, hqs the jurisdictinn o her appeals fom
final judgments, orders and decrees of its bankruptcy courts, and, with permission of such
court, appeals from interlocutory orders and decrees. It also provides that the judicial
council of the circuit may establish a bankruptcy appellate panel, comprised of three
bankruptcy judges from districts within the circuit, to hear, with the consent of all parties,
appeals generally heard by the district court. 28 U.S.C. § 158(d) (West Supp. 1987).
83 Id. at 112.
84 id.
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provisions, including § 707(b) and that the consumer loan indus-
try is not generally concerned with debt secured by real estate.8 5
The court's decision in In re Walton8 6 is in direct conflict with the
Appeals Panel decision. In Walton, the court noted that a mortgage
obligation was a consumer debt.8 7 The bankruptcy court in In re Bryant
reached the same conclusion. 88 Neither of these decisions, however,
mentions the legislative history to section 101(7) nor the fact that other
courts have construed the term consumer debt to exclude mortgage
debt.8 9
The rationale used by the Appeals Panel in Kelly to conclude that
mortgage obligations are not consumer debt is not persuasive. The
Appeals Panel stated that unless the secured debt is disregarded, all
debtors owning a family home could be denied relief because their
indebtedness would be primarily consumer debt. However, under section
707(b), a debtor will be denied relief under Chapter 7 only if the granting
of relief would be substantial abuse. When a case constitutes substantial
abuse, a debtor should not be granted relief simply because he or she has
a mortgage. Moreover, while the consumer loan industry may not be
concerned with debt secured by real estate, excluding such debt from the
definition of consumer debt could result in fewer dismissals under section
707(b), not because of the absence of substantial abuse, but because the
debts are not primarily consumer debts. Accordingly, this interpretation
defeats the goals of the consumer loan industry and the purpose of the
Consumer Credit Amendments.
The preferred view is that mortgage obligations incurred primarily for
personal, family, or household purposes are consumer debt. Clearly, this
is the result reached by looking at the plain meaning of the language,
and, as noted in Kelly, individual explanatory comments cannot be used
to rewrite plain language. Furthermore, there is no reason to exclude
mortgage debt incurred for personal, family, or household purposes from
the term "consumer debt."
C. Focus On "Incurred"
Consumer debt is debt incurred by an individual primarily for a
personal, family, or household purpose.90 The court in In re White91
focused on the reason for incurring the obligation to determine if the
8 Id. (footnote omitted).
86 69 Bankr. 150 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1986).
87 Id. at 153-54 n.4.
s 47 Bankr. 21 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 1984).
89 Both of these cases were decided prior to the Appeals Panel decision in Kelly.
90 11 U.S.C.A. § 101(7) (West 1979).
"' 49 Bankr. 869 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 1985).
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obligation was a consumer debt. The specific issue in White was whether
a $375,000 judgment against the bankruptcy petitioner for a negligent
automobile accident was a consumer debt. The court stated that the key
words in the definitions of consumer debt are "incurred," "primarily," and
"purpose." 92 The court then referred to Webster's New Collegiate Dictio-
nary (1985) for the meanings of these terms and noted:
In general, to "incur" an obligation is to meet with it, to become
liable to or to bring it down on oneself. For an incurrence to have
been "primarily" for a personal purpose means that this incur-
rence was of the first importance or was fundamental. To have a
"purpose" is to have an intention or an object set before oneself as
an aim. 93
In applying these definitions, the court stated:
Thus, to be a consumer debt within the meaning of § 101(7) the
liability must have been acquired first and foremost to achieve a
personal aim or objective. An automobile accident liability is not
such a debt. Here the obligation was incurred incidental to and
not first and foremost to achieving a personal aim; which was
gaining transportation. 94
In support of its narrow interpretation of the language, the court
observed that "there is no evidence of a congressional intention to give
the consumer debt definition... an expansive scope within the parame-
ters of § 707(b)"95 and that "the sparse legislative history implies that a
more narrow interpretation is favored. '96 Moreover, in dictum, the court
limited its definiton of consumer debt to consumer credit debt, stating
that this construction was consistent with the congressional concern
which prompted the enactment of the 1984 Amendments, including
section 707(b), that "credit costs were being driven upwards by the ready
availability of discharge via Chapter 7 to persons seeking to sidestep
consumer credit obligations who had the ability to pay."'97
In Walton,98 the United States District Court disagreed with the test
utilized in White. The court stated,
[T]he actual language of § 707(b) does not support the narrow
definition of consumer debt set forth in White. Rather, it suggests
92 Id. at 872.
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 49 Bankr. 869, 872.
97 id.
9" 69 Bankr. 150 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1986).
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the term should include those debts a person would ordinarily
expect to incur in his daily affairs other than business expenses.
The distinction drawn by the Bankruptcy Court in White be-
tween purchases on credit and other types of transactions has no
rational relation to whether a debtor is conducting his personal
life within his means. Similarly, whether a debtor incurred a
liability through volition has no real significance. 99
In applying the "debts that a person would ordinarily expect to incur in
his daily affairs" test, the court determined that virtually all the debts,
including liability for Aid to Families with Dependent Children back
payments, were consumer debts.100 Clearly, the broad approach utilized
in Walton achieves the goals of the Consumer Credit Amendments while
the test in White thwarts these objectives.
D. What is "Primarily a Consumer Debt"?
The second aspect of the phrase "primarily consumer debts" raises the
issue of the meaning of the term "primarily." The language lends itself to
99 Id. at 153.
'oo Id. at 153-54. The schedule filed by the debtor reflected the following debts:
Judgments
Laclede Gas $ 965.00
Taxes
Internal Revenue Service 400.00
Secured Debt
U.S. Dept. of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD) (Home Mortgage) 55,000.00
Unsecured Debts
James Criscione, M.D. (Feb., 1983 operation) 600.00
Cardinal Glennon Hospital (1982-83 Amelda Walton) 600.00
Anheuser-Busch Credit Union (1983 note) 6,000.00
Laclede Gas (gas service) 900.00
Cashex (check cashing service) 1,100.00
Security Storage System (furniture storage 1984) 100.00
Medical Dental Account (children's teeth) 300.00
Jewish Hospital (for spouse 1983-84) 600.00
Metropolitan Sewer (sewer service 1983) 100.00
Union Electric Co. (electric service 1984) 300.00
Incarnate Word Hospital (operation) 500.00
Gateway Account Service 500.00
Internists, M.D. (medical bills) 400.00
G.C. Services 400.00
Division of Family Services (AFDC to State) 6,984.00
Century 21-Halls Ferry (management of house) 1,600.00
Roue Motors (payment of repossession) 800.00
Home Cinema (movie rentals) 300.00
Total scheduled unsecured debts 22,084.00
Id. at 151-52.
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many possible interpretations: (1) Compare the total dollar amount of
consumer debt to the total dollar amount of non-consumer debt, and if the
total consumer debt is greater then there is consumer debt; (2) look to the
total number of debts, rather than total dollar amount, and, if more than
half the debts were consumer obligations, that would constitute primarily
consumer debts; or (3) look to the intent of the bankrupt in filing the
bankruptcy petition, and if the intent was to avoid paying consumer
debts, that would constitute primarily consumer debts even if the type
and amount of debts would not meet the total dollar test or total number
test.
There is very little case law which addresses the meaning of the term
"primarily" in the phrase "primarily consumer debts." In In re Bryant,10 1
the debtor's attorney argued that the debtor had primarily consumer debts
if the aggregate amount of the debtor's consumer debts exceeded the
aggregate amount of non-consumer debts. In response, the court stated:
The court cannot agree with such a narrow interpretation.
Certainly the relative aggregate amounts of consumer versus
nonconsumer debts are important considerations, but they are by
no means the only way by which a court can find a case to involve
"primarily consumer debts." . . . (t]he court concludes a debtor's
obligations may be adjudged "primarily consumer debts" not only
by the aggregate amount but by their relative numbers as well.102
Thus, the court retained the flexibility to dismiss a petition if only one
of the two factors were present. According to the court, this was Congress'
intent. The court reasoned that:
Given the numerous instances in the code where Congress has
established specific benchmarks to guide the Bankruptcy Court, I
can only conclude that had it intended to narrow this definition as
Debtor suggests, it would have so stated in the code provisions.
That lacking, it is my firm impression that Congress intended to
leave the definition of this term to the Bankruptcy Judge who has
the case file before him and who can make the decision in light of
all the facts and circumstances presented.10 3
Under the facts of Bryant, however, the court determined that the
aggregate dollar amount of consumer debt was more than the aggregate
dollar amount of non-consumer debt. It also determined that the total
number of consumer obligations1 4 exceeded the total number of non-con-
101 47 Bankr. 21 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 1984).
102 Id. at 26.
103 Id.
104 Id.
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sumer obligations. Specifically, the debtor had consumer debts of $46,844
as compared to $40,248 of non-consumer debt, and twelve of the debtor's
fifteen or sixteen obligations were consumer debts.'0 5
The logical approach for the bankruptcy courts to follow is to look at the
total aggregate dollar amount of consumer debt and the total aggregate
dollar amount of non-consumer debt. If the consumer debt exceeds the
non-consumer debt, the requirement of primarily consumer debt will be
fulfilled. However, it should be noted that this position was not taken in
In re Restea.l0 6 In Restea, the court concluded that consumer debt
amounting to fifty-three percent of the total debt did not constitute
primarily consumer debt for purposes of section 707(b).107 The court
stated, "[m]indful of the statutory presumption in bankruptcy of granting
debtors relief and the underlying 'fresh start' policy basis, the court
cannot find that 53 percent constitutes the principal debt."' 0 8
IV. SUBSTANTIAL ABUSE
Substantial abuse is not defined in the legislation. As such, courts have
been forced to construe the meaning of this phrase. At the crux of that
interpretation is whether a "future income test" is mandated by section
707(b). A "future income test" would require the bankruptcy court to
evaluate the debtor's future earning capacity to determine if he has the
ability to make substantial payments to his creditors.
A. Legislative History
One of the concerns that prompted enactment of section 707(b) was that
consumer debtors with the ability to repay their debts were taking
advantage of bankruptcy. The primary basis for the concern was a
consumer bankruptcy study (Purdue Study), conducted by the Credit
Research Center located at the Krammert Graduate School of Manage-
ment at Purdue University, which concluded that a substantial minority
of .consumers who file for Chapter 7 have considerable debt-paying
ability. 0 9 A review of the legislative history provides conflicting evi-
dence, however, as to whether section 707(b) includes a "future income
test." Early versions of what eventually became section 707(b) specifi-
cally provided that Chapter 7 relief would be unavailable to individuals
who could pay a reasonable portion of their debts out of anticipated future
105 Id.
106 76 Bankr. 728 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1987).
107 id. at 734.
108 Id. (footnote omitted).
109 CREDIT RESEARCH CENTER, KRANNERT SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT, PURDUE UNIVERSITY, CONSUMER
BANKRUPTCY STUDY (1982). See also S. REP. No. 446, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 7-14 (1982).
1988]
21Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1988
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
earnings." 0 This "future income test" was severely critized by Senators
Kennedy and Metzenbaum. 111 As a result of this opposition, a compro-
mise was reached that deleted the "future income" language and replaced
it with a provision permitting the court to dismiss a Chapter 7 petition
upon a showing of substantial abuse.112 At this juncture, a number of
Senators, including Senator Metzenbaum, believed that the "future
income test" had been completely eliminated from the bill. 113 However,
the Senate Report indicated otherwise, concluding that if a debtor could
meet his debts without difficulty as they came due, use of Chapter 7
would be considered substantial abuse.114
This brings us to the bill as finally enacted. The legislative history is
sparse and contradictory. During the house debate, many congressmen
indicated that a "future income test" was intended. Representative Daub
remarked:
The basic problem with the 1978 law and that [which] we seek to
correct... is the fact that credit is granted on a prospective basis,
that is one's future earnings are considered in providing the
credit. All we are asking is that when debts are discharged the
same analysis be allowed instead of the current process where-
by a snapshot of sorts is taken of the debtor's financial
position .... 1-
110 H.R. 4786, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); S. 2000, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
"' S. REP. No. 446, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 49-53 (1982) (dissenting views). Senator
Metzenbaum stated that the future income language "would have made it more difficult for
the debtor to go bankrupt and it would have provided a mortgage on his or her future." 130
CONG. REc. S5361 (daily ed. April 27, 1983).
112 S. 1013, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); S. 445, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983). The
"substantial abuse" language contained in these bills is substantially similar to section
707(b) as enacted.
113 130 CONG. REC. S5361 (daily ed. April 27, 1983).
114 S. REP. No. 65, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983). The report summarized the section of the
bill concerning dismissal for substantial abuse as follows:
This provision represents a balancing of two interests. It preserves the fundamen-
tal concept embodied in our bankruptcy laws that debtors who cannot meet debts
as they come due should be able to relinquish non-exempt property in exchange
for a fresh start. At the same time, however, it upholds creditors' interests in
obtaining repayment where such repayment would not be a burden.
Crushing debt burdens and severe financial problems place enormous strains on
borrowers and their families. Family life, personal emotional health, or work
productivity often suffer. By enabling individuals who cannot meet their debts to
start a new life, unburdened with debt they cannot pay, the bankruptcy law
allows troubled borrowers to become productive members of their communities.
Nothing in this bill denies such borrowers with unaffordable debt burdens
bankruptcy relief under Chapter 7. However, if a debtor can meet his debt without
difficulty as they come due, use of Chapter 7 would represent a substantial abuse.
Id. at 53.
... 130 CONG. REc. H1823 (daily ed. March 21, 1984); see also id. at H1811 (remarks of
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Representative Anderson stated, "a bankruptcy court could dismiss a
Chapter 7 filing if, in its opinion, the filing constitutes a substantial
abuse of the bankruptcy code because the debtor is found capable of
fulfilling the terms of a Chapter 13 repayment agreement."116
However, as the conference report was adopted by the Senate, Senator
Metzenbaum stated that "both the House and Senate have agreed to the
total elimination of the future income language . . . the availability of
bankruptcy relief would not be limited by a future earnings standard."
'117
In Senator Metzenbaum's opinion, to have included a "future income
test,"
[w]ould ... force bankruptcy judges to become soothsayers and
engage in the impossible task of predicting someone's earnings
and financial obligations. Bankruptcy relief would . . . become
hostage to a judge's guesses about how much an individual would
earn, what their financial burdens would be, whether they would
become sick, unemployed, and so on. In some cases, because
judges are human, they simply would be wrong." 8
Chairman Rodino also clearly stated, during consideration of the confer-
ence report in the House, that the provision contained no threshhold or
"future income test."1 9
Obviously, these contradictions in stated legislative intent have forced
the courts to attempt to fashion a reasonable definition of what consti-
tutes substantial abuse with little guidance from the legislative record.
Not surprisingly, the courts have utilized three different approaches to
the "future income" question: (1) use the "future income test" as the only
criteria to determine substantial abuse; (2) use the "future income test"
as one of several criteria; and (3) reject the "future income test" entirely.
B. Substantial Abuse: Exclusive Future Income Test
In In re Edwards,'20 the court defined the term "substantial abuse" by
utilizing a "future income test." The court stated, "a debtor whose income
and reasonable expenses indicate that he could pay over three years an
amount equal to 100% of the principal owed to his creditors is not
suffering from sufficient economic hardship to warrant use of Chapter
Rep. Brooks); id. at H1812 (remarks of Rep. Montgomery); id. at H1831 (remarks of Rep.
Anthony); id. at H1832 (remarks of Rep. Brown). However, after the debate, Chairman
Rodino had inserted into the Congressional Record that the substantial abuse provision
"would not create a future income test." 130 CONG. REC. H1941 (daily ed. March 26, 1984).
le 130 CONG. REC. H7499 (daily ed. June 29, 1984).
117 130 CONG. REC. S7624 (daily ed. June 19, 1984).
118 Id.
19 130 CONG. Rsc. H7489 (daily ed. June 29, 1984).
120 50 Bankr. 933 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985).
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7."121 In applying this "future income test" to the facts of the case, the
court determined that the petition should not be dismissed on the basis of
substantial abuse of Chapter 7.122
The "future income test" was the only criterion used by the court in In
re Cord.123 The court found that the debtor had sufficient income to pay
a substantial portion of her unsecured debt,124 and stated, "[u]nder such
circumstances, it makes little sense for the protection of the bankruptcy
laws to be extended to the debtor."'125 Interestingly, the court gave the
debtor ten days to convert the case to Chapter 13 before entering the
order for dismissal as "substantial abuse" of Chapter 7.126
In In re Hudson,127 the measure of "substantial abuse" was the debtor's
ability to complete a Chapter 13 plan. The court noted that Congress did
not set forth a standard by which the term "substantial abuse" was to be
measured, and reasoned:
It is well established that the provisions of Chapter 7 were
intended to afford relief to a debtor when he finds himself in
financial circumstances which threaten his immediate well-
being. If a debtor has the ability to repay all or a substantial
portion of his debts within a reasonable time, while at the same
time maintaining a reasonable standard of living, then he cannot
be so financially destitute that his immediate welfare is in
question. In the absence of such jeopardy, it is morally and legally
unconscionable that a person should be able to extinguish his
obligations without first making a reasonable effort to fulfill
them.128
The court stated, "substantial abuse, for purposes of 11 U.S.C. section
707(b), occurs when a debtor, who has filed under Chapter 7, has the
ability to repay all or a substantial portion of his debts under the auspices
121 Id. at 937. In the text of the opinion, the court justified the use of a "high screening
standard." Id. at 938. Nonetheless, in a footnote, the court indicated that it would not be
bound by the 100% figure that "[nlinety-nine percent would do as well, and in some cases
even considerably lower figures might suffice." Id. at 938 n.6. Moreover, the court added
that the "debates respecting the minimum Chapter 13 payments are a mirror to the Code
§ 707(b) considerations." Id.
122 Id. at 939. The court stated that it was "satisfied that the debtor's have little prospect
of being able to propose or complete a meaningful Chapter 13 plan." Id. Thus, while the
ability to pay out of projected income is a threshhold question to Chapter 7 relief, the
percentage or amount of debt required to be paid is not clear. See supra note 20.
", 68 Bankr. 5 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1986).
124 Id. at 7. The court found that all of the unsecured creditors could "easily be paid well
within the 60 months allottable to a Chapter 13 plan." Id. at 6.
121 Id. at 7.
126 Id.
127 56 Bankr. 415 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985).
128 Id. at 419 (citation omitted).
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of Title 11 Chapter 13"'129 and "the debtor's ability to support a Chapter
13 plan is to be the measure of substantial abuse."1 30
The court tempered this strong language, however, by noting other
factors that could be considered in examining the question of substantial
abuse. These factors included: (1) the motivation for filing under Chapter
7; (2) whether the debtor fully and accurately disclosed his or her
financial condition; and (3) whether the debtor exhibited good faith.131
The court did not explain the effect of these factors on the case, nor
under what circumstances they would be examined. It appears that the
court simply did not want to foreclose the possibility of considering
factors other than the debtor's ability to pay. However, it seems clear that
the only criterion the court planned to use in reviewing the Hudsons'
petition for substantial abuse was their ability to pay their debts.
The court was unable to rule on whether the granting of relief in this
case would result in substantial abuse of Chapter 7, as the financial
information before the court contained discrepancies and inconsistencies.
Therefore, the court ordered the debtor to file an Amended Schedule of
Current Income and Current Expenses, together with any explanations,
before determining if a dismissal under section 707(b) was appropriate.1 32
In In re Bell,133 the court stated:
The primary, if not exclusive, factor to be considered in determin-
ing whether a debtor's petition constitutes a substantial abuse of
the Bankruptcy Code under Section 707(b) is whether the debtor
will have sufficient income to repay a meaningful part of his or
her debts, within the context of either Chapter 11 or Chapter
13.134
Moreover, the court declared that it would not even consider the
"debtor's pre-petition conduct or circumstances, nor his fraud or bad faith
129 Id. (citation omitted).
130 Id. at 420. To determine if a successful Chapter 13 plan is a realistic possibility, the
court stated that the decision was to be made after considering the following factors:
1. The total amount of the debtor's income.
2. The ratio between reasonable monthly income and expenses.
3. The percentage of income that could be paid to unsecured creditors.
4. The hardship that would be imposed under a Chapter 13 plan.
5. The number of unsecured creditors.
6. The total amount of unsecured debt.
7. The nature of the unsecured debt.
Id. at 419-20.
'3' Id. at 420.
132 56 Bankr. 415, 421.
133 56 Bankr. 637 (Bankr. E.D. Mich 1986)
134 Id. at 641.
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in filing the petition itself,"'135 as other bankruptcy provisions remedy
this type of abuse. 1
36
In fact, the only factor the court considered was the debtor's ability to
pay. The court concluded that the petitioner in Bell could repay a
"meaningful part of his debt" 137 ($64,573 or 51% of his unsecured debt
over three years).138 In reaching this conclusion, some expenses were
considered unreasonable and thus eliminated or reduced. For example,
the court reduced the $480 per month expense for food, of which $430 was
for dining in restaurants, to $300.139 The $608 per month for automobile
transportation expense on an Audi was decreased to $300 per month. 140
The court remarked that it could simply not justify the expense for a
luxury automobile. 141 The $820 per month being paid to an annuity was
deleted.142 In dismissing the Chapter 7 petition, the court stated "it is
unfair and inequitable for the debtor to request that this court discharge
his debts while he accumulates substantial disposable income over the
next several years while living a relatively high lifestyle."'
143
135 Id.
136 Id.
137 Id. at 643.
131 In reaching this conclusion, the court utilized the Bankruptcy Code's criteria for
Chapter 13 plans. U.S.C. § 1325(b) provides:
(b)(1) If the trustee or the holder of an allowed unsecured claim objects to the
confirmation of the plan, then the court may not approve the plan unless, as of the
effective date of the plan
(A) the value of the property to be distributed under the plan on account of such
claim is not less than the amount of such claim; or
(B) the plan provides that all of the debtor's projected disposable income to be
received in the three-year period beginning on the date that the first payment is
due under the plan will be applied to make payments under the plan.
(2) For purposes of this subsection, "disposable income" means income which is
received by the debtor and which is not reasonably necessary to be expended
(A) for the maintenance or support of the debtor of a dependent of the debtor; or
(B) if the debtor is engaged in business for the payment of expenditures necessary
for the continuation, preservation, and operation of such business.
Interestingly, these criteria were applied even though the debtor was ineligible for Chapter
13 relief because of the amount of his unsecured debt. The court opined that a Chapter 11
plan similar to the Chapter 13 plan could be confirmed. 56 Bankr. 637, 641. Contra In re
Mastroeni, 56 Bankr. 456 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985).
13' 56 Bankr. at 642.
140 Id.
141 Id.
142 Id.
143 Id. at 643.
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C. Substantial Abuse: Future Income Test One Factor
One of the earliest cases to confront the issue of what constitutes
substantial abuse was the previously-discussed case of In re Bryant.""
The court determined that it should use the traditional "ordinary and
plain meaning 145 test to interpret the statutory language, and that test
would not allow the debtor to "lead the life of Riley at his creditor's
expense."146
The court noted that the intent of the Bankruptcy Code was to provide
a "fresh start" for financially troubled persons, not "a means for the
unscrupulous to avoid their creditors."'147 In effect, the court applied a
"good faith" test to the specific facts and determined that the individual
debtor should be denied Chapter 7 relief under section 707(b). In its
analysis of substantial abuse, the court looked at three factors:
1. Did the debtor fully and accurately disclose all of the relevant
financial information? If not, this fact would help support a
finding that "substantial abuse" was present.148
2. Was the financial trouble caused by unemployment, sickness,
or other calamity? If so, these facts would tend to establish
that "substantial abuse" was not present. 49
3. Does a review of the potential income and expenses demon-
strate the likelihood that most of the creditors could be paid off
in the future? If so, this factor would indicate "substantial
abuse" may be present.150
In applying the first factor to the facts of this case, the court found that
the debtor had an "utter disregard of his duties ... to truthfully list all
of his obligations, his monthly expenses, and to disclose his general
financial position. ... 151 In fact, the court characterized the debtor's
conduct concerning the financial statements as "fraud upon the court,"152
"misrepresentative"'15 3 and in "bad faith."'154 Additionally, the debtors
144 47 Bankr. 21 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 1984).
,45 Id. at 24.
146 Id. at 26.
147 Id. at 24.
148 Id. at 25.
149 47 Bankr. 21, 24 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 1984).
150 Id. at 24-25.
'51 Id. at 25.
112 Id. The debtor intentionally omitted a number of debts from his petition. Id. Further,
when questioned about unlisted credit card balances, the debtor indicated that the amounts
were insignificant yet he allocated $400.00 a month for these obligations in the expense
schedule. Id.
153 Id.
114 47 Bankr. 21, 25 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 1984). For example, the debtor claimed more
than $200.00 a month for medical expenses although the family basically had no recurrent
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sought bankruptcy relief not because of some calamity, but because he
"simply decided to shuck a couple of his debts."15 Finally, although the
debtor's future ability to pay was not part of the discussion, the court was
concerned with the "relatively exhorbitant lifestyle"15 6 the debtor sought
to maintain and, in the statement of facts, remarked that with "only a
modicum of restraint,"157 the debtor could pay $28,000 (67%) of his
unsecured obligations over three years. Therefore, the court concluded
that the case was one of substantial abuse of Chapter 7 and dismissed it
pursuant to section 707(b). 151
In Re Grant59 is a vivid example of the type of situation that prompted
the enactment of section 707(b). The following facts were presented in the
Grant case. The filing was a joint petition by petitioners with two minor
children, ages fifteen and twelve. The husband was employed as Vice-
President of Human Resources and Personnel at a hospital. His gross
income was $65,000, the family's total income. At the section 707(b)
hearings, the Grants testified that they had recently purchased a $700
men's suit from Saks Fifth Avenue and $2,100 worth of women's clothing
from an exclusive dress shop. Moreover, a loan for $9,000 was primarily
for Christmas items. In their original Schedule of Current Income and
Expenditures, the debtors included the cost of leasing a 1982 Mercedes
240D. This expense was eliminated in their amended schedule, but two
lease payments for a 1985 Nissan and Cutlass Sierra were added. This
netted a monthly savings of $1.
In deciding whether the petition should be dismissed, the court
considered four factors:
(1) Whether the debtors have a likelihood of sufficient future
income to fund a Chapter 13 plan which would pay a substan-
tial portion of unsecured creditors.
(2) Whether the debtors have exhibited bad faith in filing peti-
tions and schedules.
(3) Whether the debtors have engaged in eve of bankruptcy
purchases.
(4) Whether the debtors have suffered an unforeseen calamity.160
According to this court, the "[kley to the analysis is whether the debtor
medical expenses and $100.00 per month for laundry when the family owned a washing
machine. Id.
155 Id. at 24.
156 Id. at 26. For instance, the debtor claimed $65.00 a month for cable television and
$100.00 per month for dining out and movies. Id.
157 Id. at 23.
158 Id. at 26.
159 51 Bankr. 385 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985).
160 Id. at 393-94.
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could realistically fund a Chapter 13 plan which would pay a significant
portion of their claims."161 In this case, the court found that with a
"reasonable reduction in the style and cost of living," the Grants could
pay approximately 68% of their unsecured claims over five years.
162
In considering the other factors, the court determined that the Grants
exhibited bad faith in both the filing of the Chapter 7 petition and in
preparing the list of expenses on the Schedule of Current Income and
Expenditures. 1 63 With regard to the filing, the court stated, "[a]t no time
in their recent history have the debtors displayed a sincere resolve to
tighten their belts, or to incur debts with a clear intent to pay their
creditors their just due."'1 64 The court also found "excesses in the majority
of their cost-of-living expenses."165
In applying the third factor, the court noted that the debtors had
incurred extravagant expenses for consumer items within 180 days of
filing for relief and amassed $28,000 of other consumer debts the past two
years.166 Lastly, the Grants had not suffered from any unforeseen
calamity. 167 In denying bankruptcy relief under Chapter 7, the court
stated, "a discharge . . .would give them [the Grants] a 'headstart' in
the race for conspicuous consumption and its concommitant status at the
expense of their deserving creditors."' 6
8
In both Bryant and Grant, the petitioners had the ability to pay their
creditors out of future income, yet under the facts of those cases, it was
not the only factor that led the courts to dismiss under section 707(b).169
"' Id. at 394. The court reached the conclusion after reviewing the legislative history.
Further, the court noted:
A recent GAO report suggests that forty percent of those who file for Chapter 7
relief have income, assets, and debts comparable to those seeking Chapter 13
relief. These improper Chapter 7 filings may cost the lending industry as much as
$1.25 billion annually in lost revenues. And as with anything else, these losses
are passed along to consumers in the form of higher interest rates, credit fees, and
increased prices for goods and services.
Id. at 391.
162 Id. at 394.
163 id. at 394-95.
164 51 Bankr. 385, 394 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985).
165 Id.
166 Id. at 397. The amount of money spent on Christmas prompted the court to quip that
the "Grants Christmases must be quite an extravaganza." Id. at 396.
167 Id. at 397.
168 id.
"' See also In re Kress, 57 Bankr. 874, 878 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1985). This court listed five
criteria:
1. Whether the debtors have a likelihood of sufficient future income to fund a
Chapter 13 plan which would pay a substantial portion of the unsecured
claims;
2. Whether the debtors petition was filed as a consequence of illness, disability,
unemployment, or some other calamity;
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How important the other factors were in the finding of "substantial
abuse" is unclear. The court in In re Deaton170 determined that the other
factors are critical. The debtors in Deaton could "comfortably support" a
Chapter 13 plan.171 Nevertheless, the court refused to consider dismiss-
ing the petitions holding that the "mere ability to fund a Chapter 13 plan
is not sufficient to constitute substantial abuse."'172
In accord is In re Shands.173 In Shands, the court stated that an ability
to pay 100% within three years, when coupled with some egregious
circumstance, warrants dismissal for substantial abuse of Chapter 7.174
The court dismissed the case finding that the debtor could pay all of her
debts within thirty-three months and that the debtor filed for bankruptcy
to spite her former husband. 175
In In re Walton,'7 6 the court disagreed with this analysis. The court
embraced the concept that the debtor's ability to pay a substantial portion
of his debts in the future is the most important factor in determining if a
section 707(b) dismissal was appropriate, but indicated that it was not the
only relevant factor.177 However, under the analysis employed in Walton,
a petition will be dismissed as "substantial abuse" of Chapter 7 upon the
finding that a Chapter 13 plan is feasible unless other factors, such as the
presence of illness, disability, unemployment or other calamity, full
disclosure, good faith, or non-extravagant lifestyles strongly militate
against dismissal.178
It is difficult to argue with the application of a "future income test" in
the dismissal of Chapter 7 petitions pursuant to section 707(b) given facts
such as those presented in Bell and Grant. To allow such individuals to
eliminate their debts would be inequitable to their creditors. However,
the application of a "future income test" leaves a great deal of discretion
to the individual bankruptcy judges to determine which expenditures are
appropriate and which are not.
3. Whether the schedules suggest the debtors incurred cash advancements and
consumer purchases in excess of their ability to repay them;
4. Whether the debtors proposed family budget is excessive or extravagant;
5. Whether the debtors Statement of Income and Expenses is misrepresentative
of their true financial condition.
... 65 Bankr. 663 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1986).
171 Id. at 664.
172 Id. at 665.
173 63 Bankr. 121 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1985).
174 Id. at 124.
175 Id. The only debts that would not have been repaid were a small claim owed to
Consumers Power Company and a substantial claim to her former husband. Moreover, the
debtor testified that her "main purpose" in seeking bankruptcy relief was to discharge the
debt owed to her ex-husband. Id. at 123-24.
176 69 Bankr. 150 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1986).
177 Id. at 154.
178 Id.
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Obviously, such discretion can lead to very disparate results. A clear
example of the inequity that may arise from broad discretion is In re
Gaukler.179 In applying a "future income test," the court determined that
a $700 per month contribution to the debtor's church was reasonable and,
therefore, that amount was not to be considered as "future income"
available to pay creditors pursuant to a Chapter 13 plan. 180 Clearly, other
courts could hold that such an expenditure was inappropriate and that
the money should be available to creditors.
D. Substantial Abuse: No Future Income Test
The application of a "future income" test in determining dismissal
under section 707(b) was questioned by the Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy
Appeals Panel in In re Kelly. 18 The court did not make a specific
determination as to the propriety of using a "future income test" as a
standard for section 707(b) dismissals since it reversed the bankruptcy
court on other grounds. However, dicta indicated that the Appeals Panel
may not agree with the trend established by the bankruptcy courts
relating to the applicability of the "future income test."1
8 2
The Appeals Panel noted that the bankruptcy judge, relying in part
upon remarks by Congressman Andersen in the Congressional Record,
placed considerable weight upon the debtor's perceived ability to pay
under a Chapter 13 plan.18 3 The Appeals Panel cautioned that the
statements in the Congressional Record are sometimes inconsistent and
not a reliable source for interpreting a statute.184 Then the Appeals Panel
referred to Senator Metzenbaum's statement that "both the House and
Senate has [sic] agreed to the total elimination of the future income
language" and Chairman Rodino's remark that the 1984 Amendments
"contain no threshhold or future income test" in the Congressional
Record. 1 5
The Appeals Panel remanded with instructions that, "[u]pon remand
the bankruptcy judge should reconsider the application of a future income
test in determining substantial abuse under § 707."' 1s6 Although not
clearly stated, one could well interpret this language to mean that the
179 63 Bankr. 224 (Bankr. D. N.D. 1986).
'80 Id. at 225. It should be noted that the debtors were members of the Worldwide Church
of God which requires its members to donate ten percent of their income to the church. Id.
at 226.
18' 70 Bankr. 109 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1986).
182 Id. at 113.
183 Id. at 112.
184 Id.
185 Id. at 113.
186 70 Bankr. 109, 113 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1986).
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Ninth Circuit Appeals Panel has rejected the use of a "future income test"
in applying section 707(b).
An interesting example of a case that utilized a section 707(b) dismissal
without considering future income was In re Bruno.187 In Bruno, the
debtor was convicted of murdering his wife and filed a Chapter 7 petition
for the discharge of her funeral bills. The court stated that the purpose of
section 707(b) was "to prevent the use of the Bankruptcy Code to promote
injustice in any form" 188 and concluded that "[b]ankruptcy has too grand
and lofty a purpose to allow debtors to gain freedom from in-
debtedness ... incurred as a result of their crimes." 189
Other situations where substantial abuse may be found without
considering future income could include: (1) willful nonpayment of debts
with the ability to pay these debts and (2) the careless incurrence of debts
knowing bankruptcy would provide an easy way out.190
E. Solution
It is clear that the term "substantial abuse" in section 707(b) has
created a great deal of confusion and inconsistent bankruptcy court
results. This confusion stems primarily from the lack of clear legislative
intent. It is unlikely that the courts will soon be able to arrive at a
consistent and equitable resolution of whether or not section 707(b) has
mandated a "future income test."
Two expeditious solutions are possible:
(1) Congress could enact a revised version of section 707(b) that
defines the term "substantial abuse," thereby clearly estab-
lishing whether or not section 707(b) creates a mandatory
"future income test."
(2) The United States Supreme Court could promulgate a rule
defining the phrase "substantial abuse."191 The Court's inter-
pretation would then be consistently applied by the lower
courts.
Unfortunately, neither of these solutions seems probable. Congres-
sional action is unlikely in light of the amount of compromise which was
required to secure the passage of the 1984 Amendments, including
1s7 68 Bankr. 101 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1986).
188 Id. at 103.
159 Id.
190 Breitowitz, supra note 3.
191 Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 320, 98 Stat. 357, (1984) set out as a note under section 2075 of
Title 28, Judiciary and Judicial Procedure, "The Supreme Court shall prescribe general
rules implementing the practice and procedure to be followed under section 707(b) of Title
11 .... "
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section 707(b). Moreover, the Supreme Court to date has demonstrated no
inclination to promulgate a rule defining "substantial abuse."'192
As neither of these solutions is expected, the authors urge the bank-
ruptcy courts to follow the analysis used by the Deaton and Shands
courts. Under this analysis, for a finding of substantial abuse, the ability
to pay must be combined with other factors which indicate that Chapter
7 relief should be unavailable.
The authors' rationale for rejecting the position of a "future income
test" as the exclusive measure of substantial abuse is that such a
definition changes the basic structure of our bankruptcy system from
asset-based to income-based. Such a dramatic change should only be a
result of clear legislative action.
Nevertheless, a "future income test" is an important part of finding
substantial abuse. The use of ability to pay as a factor is consistent with
the concern which prompted enactment of section 707(b) and with the
requirement that the debtor submit a schedule of current income and
expenses. 193 Moreover, coupling a "future income test" with other factors
gives meaning to the term "substantial" in the phrase "substantial
abuse."
V. EFFECT OF THE PRESUMPTION TOWARD RELIEF
As previously discussed, section 707(b) provides a presumption in favor
of the relief requested by the debtor. Since the United States Supreme
Court has not promulgated rules pursuant to section 707(b), the courts
have been forced to decide what protection this presumption affords a
debtor.
Perhaps the best analysis was provided in In re Grant.19 4 The court
summarized the problem by saying, "[a] troublesome [issue] presented by
this new section is how the court is to treat the presumption in favor of
granting the relief requested by the debtor.' 195
192 In fact, the Court has thus far failed to act upon an amendment to Bankruptcy Rule
1017 proposed by the Committee of the Judicial Conference which merely provides
procedural guidelines for section 707(b) dismissals. Proposed Bankruptcy Rule section
1017(e) provides:
(e) DISMISSAL OF INDIVIDUAL DEBTOR'S CHAPTER 7 CASE FOR SUB-
STANTIAL ABUSE. An individual debtor's case under Chapter 7 may be
dismissed for substantial abuse only after a hearing on notice to the debtor
and the trustee and such other parties in interest as the court directs. The
notice shall advise the debtor of all matters which the court will consider at
the hearing.
Proposed Court Rules, 107 F.R.D. 403 (1985).
193 11 U.S.C.A. § 521 (1) (West Supp. 1986).
194 51 Bankr. 385 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985).
195 Id. at 394.
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The court applied Federal Rule of Evidence 301196 and, in doing so,
decided that its application to section 707(b) is that: If the court found
substantial abuse, bad faith, substantial future income, eve of bank-
ruptcy purchases, or other similar factors, the presumption was
rebutted.197
One of the few other cases to address the issue of the presumption was
In re Kress.19 8 In Kress, the court simplistically, and perhaps accurately,
determined that the presumption, "merely requires the Court to view the
facts of a given case in light of a presumption in favor of the debtor, a
presumption that he is entitled to Chapter 7 relief. It is not a conclusive
presumption, however, but may be rebutted by the facts themselves."'199
If these decisions are correct, as they appear to be, there is really very
little practical value to the presumption because if there is evidence of
"substantial abuse," it will almost always be sufficient to rebut the
presumption in favor of relief.
However, no discussion of section 707(b) and the effects of the presump-
tion would be complete without citing Bankruptcy Judge A. Jay Cristol in
In re Robin E. Love. 200 In that decision, Judge Cristol included the
following poem:
Once upon a midnight dreary, while I pondered
weak and weary
Over many quaint and curious files of chapter
seven lore
While I nodded nearly napping, suddenly there
came a tapping
As of someone gently rapping, rapping at my
chamber door,
"Tis some debtor" I muttered, "tapping at my
chamber door
Only this and nothing more."
Ah distinctly I recall, it was in the early fall
And the file still was small
The Code provided I could use it
If someone tried to substantially abuse it
No party asked that it be heard.
196 FED. R. Evw. 301 provides:
[A] presumption imposes on the party against whom it is directed the burden of
going forward with evidence to rebut or meet the presumption, but does not shift
to such party the burden of proof in the sense of the risk of nonpersuasion, which
remains throughout the trial upon the party is whom it was originally cast.
197 51 Bankr. 385 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985).
19 57 Bankr. 874 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1985).
199 Id. at 877.
2o 61 Bankr. 558 (Bankr. S.D. Fla 1986).
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"Sua sponte" whispered a small black bird.
The bird himself, my only maven, strongly looked
to be a raven.
Upon the words the bird had uttered
I gazed at all the files cluttered
"Sua sponte," I recall, had no meaning; none at
all.
And the cluttered files sprawl, drove a thought
into my brain.
Eagerly I wished the morrow-vainly I had sought
to borrow
From BAFJA, surcease of sorrow-and an order
quick and plain
That this case would not remain as a source of
further pain.
The procedure, it seemed plain.
As the case grew older, I perceived I must be
bolder.
And must sua sponte act, to determine every
fact,
If primarily consumer debts, are faced,
Perhaps this case is wrongly placed.
This is a thought that I must face, perhaps I
should dismiss this case.
I moved sua sponte to dismiss it for I knew I
would not miss it.
The Code said I could, I knew it.
But not exactly how to do it, or perhaps some day
I'd rue it.
I leaped up and struck my gavel.
For the mystery to unravel
Could I? Should I? Sua sponte, grant my motion
to dismiss?
While it seemed the thing to do, suddenly I
thought of this.
Looking, looking towards the future and to what
there was to see
If my motion, it was granted and an appeal came
to be,
Who would be the appellee?
Surely, it would not be me.
Who would file, but pray tell me, a learned brief
for the appellee
The District Judge would not do so
At least this much I do know.
Tell me raven, how to go.
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As I with the ruling wrestled
In the statute I saw nestled
A presumption with a flavor clearly in the
debtor's favor.
No evidence had I taken
Sua sponte appeared foresaken.
Now my motion caused me terror
A dismissal would be error.
Upon consideration of section 707(b), in anguish,
loud I cried
The court's sua sponte motion to dismiss under
section 707(b) is denied.2o1
VI. CONCLUSION
The enactment of section 707(b) lead to a great deal of confusion and
inconsistent application of its provisions primarily because evidence of
legislative intent has been so limited. It is unlikely that the problem
areas will be resolved consistently by the courts in the near future.
The promulgation of rules by the United States Supreme Court may
clear up some of the troublesome issues, but that alone is unlikely to
resolve all of the problem areas.
It may well be that a revised enactment of section 707(b) that addresses
the major issues raised to date is needed, now that Congress can be
advised of the ambiguity and uncertainty that has resulted from the
statutory language and minimal documentation of legislative intent.
However, with the difficulty encountered in the original enactment of the
statute, an amended version of section 707(b) is highly unlikely. There-
fore, the authors suggest the following approaches to the four primary
problem areas.
(1) A bankruptcy court should not hold a section 707(b) dismissal
hearing pursuant to a suggestion of, or at the request of, a party
in interest. However, the fact that the issue was raised in this
context should not foreclose the court from making its own
independent determination of the presence or absence of substan-
tial abuse.
(2) To determine if the petitioner's debts are primarily consumer
debts, the court should utilize the broad test of whether debts
were incurred in the normal course of daily affairs. If the total
aggregate dollar amount of such debt exceeds the total aggregate
20] Id. at 558-59.
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dollar amount of the other debts, then the requirement of prima-
rily consumer debts is satisfied.
(3) To determine whether substantial abuse is present or lacking,
the courts should utilize a test that includes potential future
income as one factor, but the ability to pay must be combined
with other factors that indicate Chapter 7 relief should be
unavailable to the petitioner.
(4) The presumption of dischargeability should be constructed to
require the court to view a case in favor of granting the debtor
bankruptcy relief.
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